"What is called the question of the moral sense is really two: how the moral faculty is acquired, and how it is regulated.

Why do we obey conscience or feel pain in disobeying it?
And why does conscience prescribe one kind of action and condemn another kind?
To put it more technically, there is the question of the subjective existence of conscience, and there is the question of its objective prescriptions.

First, why do I think it obligatory to do my duty?
Second, why do I think it my duty to do this and not do that?
Although, however, the second question ought to be treated independently, for reasons which we shall presently suggest, the historical answer to it, or the various grounds on which men have identified certain sorts of conduct with duty, rather than conduct of the opposite sorts, throws light on the other question of the conditions of growth of the idea of duty as a sovereign and imperial director.
Mr.Darwin seems to us not to have perfectly recognised the logical separation between the two sides of the moral sense question.

For example, he says (i.

97) that 'philosophers of the derivative school of morals formerly assumed that the foundation of morality lay in a form of Selfishness; but more recently in the Greatest Happiness principle.' But Mr.Mill, to whom Mr.Darwin refers, has expressly shown that the Greatest Happiness principle is a STANDARD, and not a FOUNDATION, and that its validity as a standard of right and wrong action is just as tenable by one who believes the moral sense to be innate, as by one who holds that it is acquired.