Smith at Cartersville, and on the 11th rode on to Kingston, where I had telegraphic communications in all directions.
From General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's army had disappeared, but in what direction he was still in doubt; and I was so strongly convinced of the wisdom of my proposition to change the whole tactics of the campaign, to leave Hood to General Thomas, and to march across Georgia for Savannah or Charleston, that I again telegraphed to General Grant: We cannot now remain on the defensive.

With twenty-five thousand infantry and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my road.

I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city; send back all my wounded and unserviceable men, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea.
Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me.

Instead of being on the defensive, I will be on the offensive.

Instead of my guessing at what he means to do, he will have to guess at my plans.