The movements of to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation.
I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making this decision; but it is better for all parties interested that no question of rank should occur in actual battle.

The Sandtown road, and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if it costs half your command.

I regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of two thousand men.
I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to whose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th: I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and I know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he can properly do so.

I recommend that his application be granted.
And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis lest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage his future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it my duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the 4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory--not imputing to him, however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that "the events did not keep pace with my desires." General Schofield had reported to me that night: I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps.

I have ordered General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops (Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been lost by two days' delay.