In other words, the same as with other enterprises, it manufactures and sells its product but, just the reverse of other enterprises, it sells the product, an equal quantity of the same product, that is to say, equal protection against the same calamities, and the equal enjoyment of the same public highway, at unequal prices, very dear to a few, moderately dear to many, at cost price to a large number, and with a discount to the mass; to this last class of consumers the discount goes on increasing like the emptiness of their purse; to the last of all, extremely numerous, the goods are delivered almost gratis, or even for nothing.
But to this inequality of prices may correspond the inequality of rights, and compensation will come, the balance may be restored, distributive justice may be applied, if, in the government of the enterprise, the parts assigned are not equal, if each member sees his portion of influence growing or diminishing along with the weight of his charge, if the regulations, graduating authority according to the scale of the levies, assigns few votes to those who pay the lowest quotas of expense and receive alms, and many votes to those who give alms and pay the largest quotas of the expenditure.
III.

Equity in taxation.
Possible compensation in the other side of the scale .-- What the distribution of rights should be according to the principle of distributive justice .-- In every association of stock-owners .-- In local society confined to its natural object .-- In local society charged with supplementary functions .-- The local statue in England and Prussia .-- The exchange equitable when burdens are compensated by rights.
Such is the rule in every association of interests, even in stock companies in which the distribution of charges allows of no favor or disfavor to any associate.

It must be noted that, in these companies, co-operation is not compulsory, but voluntary; the associates are not, as in the local society, conscripts enlisted under the constraint of physical solidarity, but subscribers bound together under the impulsion of a deliberate preference, each remaining in its of his own free will just as he entered it; if he wishes to leave it he has only to sell his stock; the fact of his keeping this confirms his subscription, and, thus holding on to it, he daily subscribes anew to the statute.

Here, then, is a perfectly free association; its is accordingly perfectly equitable, and its statute serves as a model for others.
Now this statute always makes a distinction between the small and the large stockholders; it always attributes a greater share of authority and influence to those who share most largely in the risks and expenses; in principle, the number of votes in confers on each associate is proportionate to the number of shares of which he is the owner or bearer .-- All the stronger is the reason why this principle should be embodied in the statutes of a society which, like the local community, diminishes the burden of the small taxpayer through its reductions, and increases by its extra taxation the burden of the large or average taxpayer; when the appointment of managers is handed over to universal suffrage, counted by heads, the large and average taxpayers are defrauded of their dues and deprived of their rights, more so by far and more deeply wronged than the bearer or owner of a thousand shares in an omnibus or gas company if, on voting at a meeting of stockholders, his vote did not count for more than that of the owner or bearer of a single share .-- How is it then when a local society adds to its natural and unavoidable purpose an optional and supplementary purpose; * when, increasing its load, it undertakes to defray the cost of public charity and of primary education; * when, to support this additional cost, it multiplies the additional centimes; * when the large or average taxpayer pays alone, or nearly alone, for this benevolent work by which he does not benefit; * when the small taxpayer pays nothing, or next to nothing, to this benevolent work by which he does benefit; * when, in voting for the expense thus apportioned, each taxpayer, whatever the amount of his contribution, has one vote and only one?
In this case, powers, benefits, reductions, and exemptions, all the advantages are on one side, that of the poor and half-poor forming the majority and who if not restrained from above, will persistently abuse their numerical force to augment their advantages, at the increasing expense of the rich or well-do-do minority.

In the future, in the local society, the average or large taxpayer is no longer an associate but a victim; were he free to choose he would not enter into it; he would like to go away and establish himself elsewhere; but were he to enter others, near or remote, his condition would be no better.