In the first place, the public powers must harmonize with each other, if not, one will neutralize the other; in the second place they must be obeyed, or they are null.
The Constituent Assembly made no provision for securing this harmony or this obedience.

In the machine which it constructed the motions all counteract each other; the impulse is not transmitted; the gearing is not complete between the center and the extremities; the large central and upper wheels turn to no purpose; the innumerable small wheels near the ground break or get out of order: the machine, by virtue of its own mechanism, remains useless, over-heated, under clouds of waste steam, creaking and thumping in such a matter as to show clearly that it must explode.
I .-- Powers of the Central Government.
The Assembly on the partition of power .-- Rupture of every tie between the Legislature and the King .-- The Assembly on the subordination of the executive power .-- How this is nullified .-- Certainty of a conflict .-- The deposition of the King is inevitable.
Let us first consider the two central powers, the Assembly and the King .-- Ordinarily when distinct powers of different origin are established by a Constitution, it makes, in the case of conflict between them, a provision for an arbiter in the institution of an Upper Chamber.
Each of these powers, at least, has a hold on the other.

The Assembly must have one on the King: which is the right to refuse taxation.

The King must have one on the Assembly: which is the right of dissolving it.
Otherwise, one of the two being disarmed, the other becomes omnipotent, and, consequently, insane.

The peril here is as great for an omnipotent Assembly as it is for an absolute King.