Mr.Adams and those who voted with him did not believe that the notice to the British Government would provoke a war, but that firmness on our part, in the negotiation which should ensue, would induce England to yield her pretensions to any part of Oregon; to which Mr.Adams maintained, with elaboration of argument and demonstration, she had no shadow of right.
Mr.Adams was opposed to war with Mexico, and therefore did not draw his conclusions from the premises laid down by those who were charged with the policy of the administration.

They naturally argued that a war with Great Britain might end in our losing the whole of Oregon, without acquiring any territory on our south- western border.

The bare possibility of such a result would defeat the policy which they were seeking to uphold, and would at the same time destroy their party.

In short, it became apparent that what might be termed the Texas policy of the administration, and what might be termed the Oregon policy, could not both be carried out.
It required no prophet to foresee which would be maintained and which would be abandoned.

"Fifty-four forty or fight" had been a good cry for the political campaign; but, when the fight was to be with Great Britain, the issue became too serious to be settled by such international law as is dispensed on the stump.
COMPROMISE ON THE OREGON QUESTION.
A very bitter controversy over the question began in the Senate as soon as the House resolution was received.