Various operations went on during the next three days, presumably pursuant of the purpose stated in Warren's subsequent account of {p.257} his proceedings--"We must first capture the position in front of us." The estimate of their effect by Buller, who was at the scene on the 21st and 22nd, is best given in the words of his report to Lord Roberts.

"I went over to Sir C.Warren on the 23rd.
I pointed out to him that I had no further report and no intimation of the special arrangements foreshadowed by his telegram of the 19th, that for four days he had kept his men exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any moment.

I said it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw his force.

I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance from his left." This last phrase does not make certain whether Buller's judgment coincided with that of Warren concerning the impracticability of the Acton Homes route, but it seems to indicate that it did not.
Warren {p.258} replied that he had intended to assault Spion Kop the night before, but had not done so because the general told off for the work wished first to reconnoitre the ground.

It was decided that the attack should be made that night, and General Woodgate was detailed for the command at Buller's "suggestion"-- or, to use Warren's words, "the Commander-in-Chief desired." The assault was made that night and was entirely successful, the British gaining possession of the summit and remaining there all next day.