His idea of warfare was to act ever on the defensive." Let this be qualified so far as to say that his idea appears always to have been to act within limits of safety, to consider self-preservation--the preservation, that is, of his own forces--more important than the destruction of the enemy, and we have a view, not of Joubert only, but of his race, which goes {p.199} far to explain the failures at Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and likewise the inefficient action at that early period of the war when alone success was locally possible, and, if locally attained, might have even compassed an ultimate victory.

If to this idea be linked that which is closely akin to it--of attaining results, not by superior dexterity in the use of means, but by subtlety and ambush--and we have the explanation both of the numerous artful traps into which British detachments were led, like game into the snare of the hunter, and yet also of the sure failure to achieve success in war, for the craft of the hunter is not the skill of the warrior.
The cognate words "stratagem" and "strategist" sufficiently indicate that craft and wile are part of the professional equipment of great warriors, but with them these are not, and cannot be, predominant.
Their skill is not so much to contrive success by deceiving an enemy as to command it by local superiority of force, either exerted in violence, or imposing submission by mere evidence of overpowerment.
Circumvention with them aims at permanent results which it alone cannot obtain.

It {p.200} is but a means to the end, which is the crushing, the military annihilation, of the enemy.

That can be accomplished only by force, not by mere guile.

In his temperament, as shown by his action, Joubert reflected the fighting characteristics of his people, of whom he has been the most conspicuous military representative, honoured by friend and foe alike for his fearlessness, his intelligence, and his humanity.