A cavalry brigade and a horse artillery battery from my right would have made good my success." The British loss at Belmont was 53 killed, 275 wounded; that of the Boers is not accurately known.
Two days later at Graspan the Boers were in about the same force and the natural conditions similar in general character.

The Boer line extended east and west, and at the latter end--their right--were "two high hills." These were bombarded with shrapnel, the effect of which was more thoroughly tested, one battery alone firing 500 rounds to clear the summit, before the infantry were allowed to advance.

The men again fought their way to the top, but again the enemy got away.

"The heights gained, I found I had taken the whole Boer force in flank, and had entirely cut them off from their line of retreat.

My guns played on the masses of horsemen, but my few cavalry, dead beat, were {p.151} powerless, and for the second time I longed for a cavalry brigade and horse artillery battery to let me reap the fruits of a hard-fought action." "The loss in both these actions," Methuen says, "was great, and convinces me that if an enemy has his heart in the right place he ought to hold his own against vastly superior forces, and it does our men great credit that nothing stops them." Both actions, in short, illustrate the same lessons, the Boers' particular advantages for defence, their readiness in retreat, and, it must be added, the prompt facility with which they resorted to it.
When the most that can be said has been said for their methods--and much can be said--it still remains that an eye ever to the rear, upon escape, is militarily a demoralising attitude upon which no sound system of warfare can be built up.