In the obscurity, however, the latter lost direction and the general found himself in consequence committed to a frontal attack.
Orders were therefore sent to the left wing, which had not lost its direction, to conform its movements to those of the right, and the attack was delivered in front.

The Boers are estimated to have been 2,000 to 2,500 men, the kopjes affording them three lines of defence in successive ridges.
Although the error in direction had necessitated a change in the method of attack, the {p.149} time had been exact; the line had started at 3 A.M., reaching the foot of the hills before daybreak.
This could scarcely have been much later than 4 A.M., for in the southern hemisphere summer was near.

The musketry fire of the Boers opened soon after, "and the troops instinctively moved toward the enemy's position." The advance was covered by artillery, which, however, was slow in its movements, "the horses not having yet recovered from a five weeks' voyage." Criticism has said that the artillery was not sufficiently employed to silence the enemy's riflemen, but Lord Methuen alleges that shrapnel does not kill men in kopjes; "it only frightens them, and I intend to get at my enemy." The inferiority of shrapnel to shell, in use against kopjes, has been asserted by many observers.

For these various reasons the battle of Belmont reduced itself to a magnificent charge by a much superior force up a stony and precipitous hill against an enemy strongly intrenched.

"At 6.10 the last height was cleared, the enemy in large numbers galloping into the plain, their laager trekking across me 3,000 yards off, {p.150} my mounted troops unable to carry out their orders on one side--left--because the retreat was covered by kopjes, and on the other--right--because too far; the artillery dead beat and unable to help me.