From them, particularly, was formed a corps of irregular horse, which filled the want of mounted troops that at first was severely felt.

Colonel Kekewich, recognising the enemy's overpowering superiority of numbers, rapidly drew {p.139} into Kimberley all the outlying forces of every character under his command.
Although deeply concerned for the safety of the Modder River bridge, upon which in a measure would depend the advance of a relief column, "I was most anxious," he says, "that no disposition of troops made by me should give the enemy a chance of scoring a first success, even where the smallest body of British troops might be concerned.

Taking into consideration that the enemy would probably not regulate his movements in accordance with the dictates of sound strategy, that he was in possession of mobile artillery in my immediate neighbourhood, I felt that if I had detached a small body of troops, necessarily without artillery, which it was not in my power to support from Kimberley, the enemy would in all probability concentrate very superior numbers, with artillery, against the small British post, and endeavour to destroy the troops composing the same.

It was principally for this reason that I determined to concentrate all my available forces, including the Cape Police, at the point of greatest importance in my command--Kimberley." The {p.140} inference of Colonel Kekewich as to the Boers' strategy was as accurate as his general action was militarily judicious.

The concentration and development of his resources not merely deterred the enemy from assault, but detained them there in force, to the neglect of matters elsewhere much more urgently worthy of their efforts.