In Natal, now, the tables were turned, the defence had broken down, and the army charged with it was shut up by a force so far superior as to enable it, not only to carry on the siege, but {p.132} to make at least serious inroads upon the colony, if not to advance permanently to positions of more extensive control, to dislodge it from which greater effort would be needed.

The question now to be decided was whether relief would be best effected by adhering to the original plan of moving in force upon Bloemfontein, leaving Ladysmith to look out for itself, and only strengthening the forces in Natal outside of the place sufficiently to check any further advance of the enemy; or whether to attempt speedier succour by a direct advance along the roads leading to one or both of the besieged places.
The first, if successfully carried out, would eventually take in the rear the assailants both of Kimberley and Ladysmith, threatening them with the severance of their communications--concerning which the Boers are exceptionally sensitive--and thus would raise the siege by compelling the retreat of the besiegers.

This plan, moreover, would be faithful to general military principle, by keeping the great mass of the British Army concentrated upon a single object, and under a single hand.
The {p.133} alternative possessed the drawback of dividing the army into two bodies virtually independent in their several movements, out of mutual supporting distance, and each distinctly weaker than the single mass intended for the great central operation of the former plan.

The second also laboured under the other disadvantages that a direct advance naturally has as compared to a turning movement.

The enemy would be met always in front--thus covering his communications and with retreat open--in positions assumed tactically with a view to prevent flank attacks and to compel assault in front, the most dangerous to make.
In choosing their ground for their objects, the Boers have shown remarkable aptitude.