Control at a distant capital, exercised by an obstinate, overbearing old man, who, though unquestionably shrewd and acute, was equally unquestionably narrow with the narrowness of contracted experience and {p.124} limited military knowledge, boded ill for the Boer cause.

While Cronje at Mafeking, and Wessels at Kimberley, and Joubert at Ladysmith were waiting for a moment that never came, time was flying, the hostile reinforcements were speeding forward 300 miles a day, and the very danger of the three places was goading the British people into wide-awake activity.
Yet more imminent was the nearer opportunity, fast disappearing into the nearer danger, ultimately to become the established and fatal centre of ruin--at De Aar.

"This was not the sort of fighting-ground the Boer is wont to choose," wrote one there present, "but we felt that he must come because we menaced his frontier sixty miles away, and tempted him with such an amount of stores, guns, and ammunition as would enable him to prolong his warfare at least two months longer than his own resources would permit." A somewhat narrow view this, leaving out of the account De Aar's intrinsic advantage in position; but to continue--"Every day that the Boers delayed our camp grew stronger, though this was not the case before General {p.125} Buller arrived at the Cape (October 31).

Until then we had only one battalion--about 800 men--to protect stores estimated at half a million pounds; but within forty-eight hours a battery and a half--nine guns--had arrived from England, to be followed by another half battery from the Orange River."[11] [Footnote 11: Ralph's "Toward Pretoria," p.

97.] The position of De Aar indicated it absolutely as a point which the British must hold, fortify, and use as a depot and base.