Add to this the convergence upon it of the several lines of supply from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, and it is evident that the line would present particular advantages for the assembling of a British army intending to invade the Free State by the most probable, because most advantageous, route, the direct highroad to Bloemfontein.

It is, indeed, the key, the central military position of this theatre of war; not geometrically, by mere measurement of distance, but as the place where converge and unite all the great communications from {p.115} the opposing bases of operations, which at the first would be, for the Free State, the Orange River, and for Great Britain, the line of seaports.
The distance from the frontier and the interposition of the mountain range in the Steynsburg district would combine to make observation of preliminary movements difficult to the enemy, except, indeed, by information from the disaffected inhabitants who abounded.

The secure and undisturbed tenure of this line would therefore much facilitate the British campaign, should it develop against the Free State; consequently the first aim of the Boer commanders should have been to hold, or if not able to hold, to destroy it effectually as regards steam communication.
It is as yet impossible to say exactly what was the force of the Boers on their western frontiers between the middle and the end of October.
Steevens, as above quoted, thought 12,000 at the earlier date.

A more likely reckoning seems to me to be 8,000, but it probably rose near the higher figure before November, and must much have exceeded it by the 1st of December, unless British {p.116} estimates are more wide of the mark than is probable.

The lowest maximum for the forces of the two republics that I have seen was given by one of the Boer envoys now[9] in the United States; viz., 38,000.