A third-class port cannot be suddenly raised to the business of one of the first class, and be found either competent or convenient.

Consequently, the congestion at the docks, wharves, and railroads was very great.

Many ships were kept waiting two months, or even more, for discharge; a fact which means not merely expense, though that is bad enough, but delay in operations, which in turn may be the loss of opportunity--and the equivalent of this again is prolongation of war, loss of life, and other miseries.
The practical lesson of this embarrassment at Cape Town should not be lost to those who {p.100} assume too lightly that the traffic of the Suez Canal can in time of war be turned to the Cape route.

The question of necessity for coaling at Cape Town, and the facilities for it should at least be exhaustively studied before accepting this solution as final, or even probable.

It is evident that, for the operations of this war, the use of Port Elizabeth, Port Alfred, and East London, although they have no docks at which steamers can lie and discharge, would to some extent relieve Cape Town; but that such relief should be effective at the front, it was necessary also that the railroads from them should be securely held up to their junctions with the main line.