It is true Lee tried the same system, and succeeded, by sending Jackson around to attack Hooker's right, but the success was due solely to the utter lack of all preparations on the part of Howard to meet the emergency, and to Hooker's failure to make use of the ample means at his disposal to prevent the junction of Stuart and Anderson.
Mr.Alden, the author of the work in question, says: "There was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of the Union army.

The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached, and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly conceived and admirably executed.

The initial error, by which alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville.
Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been resumed early in the following morning, the army would have got clear of the Wilderness without meeting any great opposing force, and then it would have been in a position where its great superiority of numbers would have told.

The rout of Howard's corps was possible only from the grossest neglect of all military precautions.

Jackson, after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open ground, not two miles from the Union lines.