He says, at the close of the action, that fifty guns posted to the right and front of the Chancellorsville House would have swept the enemy away.
I think Hooker was beset with the idea of keeping back a large portion of his force to be used in case of emergency.

It appears from a statement made by General Alexander S.Webb, who had made a daring personal reconnoissance of the enemy's movement, that he was present when Meade--acting on his (Webb's) representations, and speaking for himself and Reynolds--asked Hooker's permission to let the First and Fifth Corps take part in the battle.

It is fair, however, to state that Hooker, having been injured and in great pain, was hardly accountable for his want of decision at this time.

Indeed, General Tremaine, who was a colonel on Sickles' staff, says that Hooker did intend to use his reserve force as soon as the enemy were utterly exhausted.

President Lincoln seems to have had a presentiment of what would occur, for his parting words to Hooker and Couch were, to use all the troops and not keep any back.
I have stated that both Meade and Reynolds wished to put their corps in at the vital point, but were not allowed to do so.