Notwithstanding the reports of Jackson's movement from spies and scouts, Howard ordered no change in his lines.
An attempt has been made to hold Colonel Farmer responsible for this surprise, on the ground that he should have charged the battery and brought in some prisoners, who would give full information; but there had been warnings enough, and prisoners enough, and as Colonel Farmer had but forty men, he would have had to dismount half of them to make the assault, and with part of his force holding the horses, he could only have used about twenty men in the attack, which is rather too few to capture guns supported by an army.
Besides, Farmer was sent out by General Pleasonton with specific instructions, and was not obliged to recognize the authority of other officers who desired him to make a Don Quixote of himself to no purpose.
If the two wings of the rebel army had been kept apart, the small force left under Lee could easily have been crushed, or driven off toward Richmond.

The commander of the Eleventh Corps, however, far from making any new works, did not man those he had, but left his own lines and went with Barlow's brigade to see what Sickles was doing.
The subsequent investigation of this sad business by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was very much of a farce, and necessarily unreliable; for so long as both Hooker and Howard were left in high command, it was absurd to suppose their subordinates would testify against them.

Any officer that did so would have soon found his military career brought to a close.
Howard was in one or two instances mildly censured for not keeping a better lookout, but as a general thing the whole blame was thrown on the Germans.

Hooker himself attributed the trouble to the fact that Howard did not follow up Jackson's movements, and allowed his men to stray from their arms.
A great French military writer has said, "It is permissible for an officer to be defeated; but never to be surprised." It is, of course, only fair to hear what Howard himself has to say in relation to this matter.
He writes in his official report of the battle as follows: "Now as to the cause of the disaster to my corps.
"_First_ .-- Though constantly threatened, and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet the woods were so dense that he was able to move a large force, whose exact whereabouts neither patrols, reconnoissances, nor scouts ascertained.
"He succeeded in forming a column opposite to and outflanking my right.
"_Second_ .-- By the panic produced by the enemy's reverse fire, regiments and artillery were thrown suddenly upon those in position.
"_Third_ .-- The absence of General Barlow's brigade, which I had previously located in reserve, and in _echelon_ with Colonel Von Gilsa's, so as to cover his right flank." The first proposition implies that Howard did not know Jackson intended to attack his right, and therefore did not prepare for him in that direction, but as his front was well fortified, and his flank unprotected, it was plainly his duty to strengthen the weak part of his line.

To suppose that Jackson would run a great risk, and spend an entire day in making this long circuit for the purpose of assailing his enemy in front, is hardly reasonable; for he could have swung his line around against it at once, had he desired to do so.
The fierce rush of the rebels, who came in almost simultaneously with the pickets, first struck General Von Gilsa's two small regiments and the two guns in the road, the only force that actually fronted them in line.
Von Gilsa galloped at once to Howard's Headquarters at Dowdall's Tavern to ask for immediate reinforcements.