Buschbeck held a weak intrenched line perpendicular to the plank road for three-quarters of an hor, with artillery on the right, losing one-third of his force.

His enemy then folded around his flanks and took him in reverse, when further resistance became hopeless and his men retreated in good order to the rear of Sickles' line at Hazel Grove where they supported the artillery and offered to lead a bayonet charge, if the official reports are to be believed.

Warren says he took charge of some batteries of the Eleventh Corps and formed them in line across the Plank Road without any infantry support whatever.
In reference to this surprise, Couch remarks that no troops could have stood under such circumstances, and I fully agree with him.
An officer of the Eleventh Corps who was present informed General Wainwright, formerly Colonel of the 76th New York, that he was playing cards in the ditch, and the first notice he had of the enemy was seeing them looking down upon him from the parapet above.
As for Devens, who was nearest the enemy, it is quite probable that any attempt by him to change front to the west previous to the attack would have been looked upon by Howard as a reflection upon his own generalship and would have been met with disfavor, if not with a positive reprimand.

The only semblance of precaution taken, therefore, was the throwing out two regiments to face Jackson's advance.

Devens could not disgarnish his main line without Howard's permission, and it is not fair, therefore, to hold him responsible for the disaster.