Jackson was celebrated for making these turning movements; besides, it was easy, by questioning prisoners, to verify the fact that he had no surplus trains with him.

Nothing, in short, but ammunition wagons, and ambulances for the wounded; a sure indication that his movement meant fight and not retreat.
From 10 A.M., when Hooker's order was received, to 6 P.M., when the assault came, there was ample time for Howard to form an impregnable line.

His division commanders did not share his indifference.

General Schurz pointed out to him that his flank was in the air, but he seemed perfectly satisfied with his line as it was, and not at all desirous of changing it in any particular.
Schurz, of his own volition, without the knowledge of his chief, posted three regiments in close column of division, and formed them in the same direction as the two regiments and two guns which were expected to keep Jackson back, but the shock, when it came, was so sudden that these columns did not have time to deploy.

Devens, having two reserve regiments, also faced them that way, of his own accord, behind the other two, but having no encouragement to form line in that direction it is probable both generals hesitated to do so.
Jackson, having debouched from the country road into the plank road, was separated from Lee by nearly six miles of pathless forest.
He kept on until he reached the turnpike, and then halted his command in order that he might reconnoitre and form line of battle.
He went up on a high hill and personally examined the position of the Eleventh Corps.