There was no reason other than Howard's utter want of appreciation of the gravity of the situation to prevent him from forming a strong line of defence to protect his right flank.

If made with felled timber in front and redoubts on the flanks, Jackson could not have overleaped it, or even attacked it without heavy loss.

If he stopped to do so, Sickles' corps and Williams' division of the Twelfth Corps, with the reserve forces under Berry and French, would soon have confronted him.

If he had attempted to keep on farther down to attack the United States Ford, he would have met the First Corps there, and would have permanently severed all connection between himself and Lee, besides endangering his line of retreat.

The apathy and indifference Howard manifested in relation to Jackson's approach can only be explained in the supposition that he really believed that Jackson had fled to Gordonsville, and that the demonstrations on his front and right proceeded merely from Stuart's cavalry; and yet why any one should suppose that Lee would part with half his army, and send it away to Gordonsville where there was no enemy and nothing to be done, is more than I can imagine.