CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.
At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his reconnoissance.

He said the right flank of Howard's corps was defenceless and easily assailable.

Jackson at once asked permission to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly upon the weak point referred to by Stuart.

It was a startling proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven back to Fredericksburg or crushed.

If the Eleventh Corps had prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber and sheltered by breastworks, with the artillery at the angles, crossing its fire in front, Jackson's corps would have been powerless to advance, and could have been held as in a vise, while Lee, one- half of his force being absent, would have found himself helpless against the combined attack of our other corps, which could have assailed him in front and on each flank.
There was, therefore, great risk in attempting such a manoeuvre, for nothing short of utter blindness on the part of the Union commanders could make it successful.
Still, something had to be done, for inaction would result in a retreat, and in the present instance, if the worst came to the worst, Jackson could fall back on Gordonsville, and Lee toward the Virginia Central Railroad, where they could reunite their columns by rail, before Hooker could march across the country and prevent the junction.