This was a serious thing to me, for the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my reserves.

It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out.
It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been _echeloned_ in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at the Almshouse.

The enemy then could not have turned the right without compromising the safety of the turning column and endangering his communications; a movement he would hardly like to make, especially as he did not know what troops might be coming up.
Still they had a preponderating force, and as their whole army was concentrating on Gettysburg, it was not possible to keep them back for any great length of time unless the First and Eleventh Corps were heavily reinforced.

The position of our forces and those of the enemy, will be best understood by a reference to the map on page 125.
About 2 P.M., after the Eleventh Corps line was formed, General Howard rode over, inspected, and approved it.

He also examined my position and gave orders, in case I was forced to retreat, to fall back to Cemetery Hill.