A retreat, too, has a bad effect on the men.

It gives them the impression that their generals think them too weak to contend with the enemy.

I was not aware, at this time, that Howard was on the ground, for he had given me no indication of his presence, but I knew that General Meade was at Taneytown; and as, on the previous evening, he had informed General Reynolds that the enemy's army were concentrating on Gettysburg, I thought it probable he would ride to the front to see for himself what was going on, and issue definite orders of some kind.

As Gettysburg covered the great roads from Chambersburg to York, Baltimore, and Washington, and as its possession by Lee would materially shorten and strengthen his line of retreat, I was in favor of making great sacrifices to hold it.
While we were thus temporarily successful, having captured or dispersed all the forces in our immediate front, a very misleading despatch was sent to General Meade by General Howard.

It seems that General Howard had reached Gettysburg in advance of his corps, just after the two regiments of Cutler's brigade, which had been outflanked, fell back to the town by General Wadsworth's order.
Upon witnessing this retreat, which was somewhat disorderly, General Howard hastened to send a special messenger to General Meade with the baleful intelligence that the First Corps had fled from the field at the first contact with the enemy, thus magnifying a forced retreat of two regiments, acting under orders, into the flight of an entire corps, two-thirds of which had not yet reached the field.
It is unnecessary to say that this astounding news created the greatest feeling against the corps, who were loudly cursed for their supposed lack of spirit and patriotism.
About 11 A.M., the remainder of the First Corps came up, together with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries.