But China will come in on any terms that include neutrality and security.
The question then arises as to the Imperial Powers whose dynastic enterprise is primarily to be hedged against by such a league.
Reflection will show that if the league is to effect any appreciable part of its purpose, these Powers will also be included in the league, or at least in its jurisdiction.

A pacific league not including these Powers, or not extending its jurisdiction and surveillance to them and their conduct, would come to the same thing as a coalition of nations in two hostile groups, the one standing on the defensive against the warlike machinations of the other, and both groups bidding for the favor of those minor Powers whose traditions and current aspirations run to national (dynastic) aggrandizement by way of political intrigue.

It would come to a more articulate and accentuated form of that balance of power that has latterly gone bankrupt in Europe, with the most corrupt and unreliable petty monarchies of eastern Europe vested with a casting vote; and it would also involve a system of competitive armaments of the same general character as what has also shown itself bankrupt.

It would, in other words, mean a virtual return to the _status quo ante_, but with an overt recognition of its provisional character, and with the lines of division more sharply drawn.

That is to say, it would amount to reinstating the situation which the projected league is intended to avert.