What would be your condition, inhabitants of Paris, if a minister, however superior his abilities, should undertake to substitute, in the place of this power, the combinations of his own genius?
If he should think of subjecting to his own supreme direction this prodigious mechanism, taking all its springs into his own hand, and deciding by whom, how, and on what conditions each article should be produced, transported, exchanged and consumed?
Ah! although there is much suffering within your walls; although misery, despair, and perhaps starvation, may call forth more tears than your warmest charity can wipe away, it is probable, it is certain, that the arbitrary intervention of government would infinitely multiply these sufferings, and would extend among you the evils which now reach but a small number of your citizens.
If then we have such faith in this principle as applied to our private concerns, why should we not extend it to international transactions, which are assuredly less numerous, less delicate, and less complicated?
And if it be not necessary for the prefect of Paris to regulate our industrial pursuits, to weigh our profits and our losses, to occupy himself with the quantity of our cash, and to equalize the conditions of our labor in internal commerce, on what principle can it be necessary that the custom-house, going beyond its fiscal mission, should pretend to exercise a protective power over our external commerce?
XIX.
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.
Among the arguments advanced in favor of a restrictive system, we must not forget that which is drawn from the plea of _national independence_.
"What will we do," it is asked, "in case of war, if we are at the mercy of England for our iron and coal ?" The English monopolists, on their side, do not fail to exclaim: "What will become of Great Britain in case of war if she depends upon France for provisions ?" One thing appears to be quite lost sight of, and this is, that the dependence which results from commercial transactions, is a _reciprocal_ dependence.

We can only be dependent upon foreign supplies, in so far as foreign nations are dependent upon us.

This is the essence of _society_.
The breaking off of natural relations places a nation, not in an independent position, but in a state of isolation.
And remark that the reason given for this isolation, is that it is a necessary provision for war, while the act is itself a commencement of war.

It renders war easier, less burdensome, and consequently less unpopular.

If nations were to one another permanent outlets for mutual produce; if their respective relations were such that they could not be broken without inflicting the double suffering of privation and of over-supply, there could then no longer be any need of these powerful fleets which ruin, and these great armies which crush them; the peace of the world could no more be compromised by the whim of a Thiers or a Palmerston, and wars would cease, from want of resources, motives, pretexts, and popular sympathy.
I know that I shall be reproached (for it is the fashion of the day) for placing interest, vile and prosaic interest, at the foundation of the fraternity of nations.