The article thus pays ten francs for transportation, ten for the tax.
This done, we say to ourselves: Transportation between Brussels and Paris is very dear; let us spend two or three millions in railways, and we will reduce it one-half.

Evidently the result of such a course will be to get the Belgian article at Paris for thirty-five francs, viz: 20 francs--price at Brussels.
10 " duty.
5 " transportation by railroad.
-- 35 francs--total, or market price at Paris.
Could we not have attained the same end by lowering the tariff to five francs?
We would then have-- 20 francs--price at Brussels.
5 " duty.
10 " transportation on the common road.
-- 35 francs--total, or market price at Paris.
And this arrangement would have saved us the 200,000,000 spent upon the railroad, besides the expense saved in custom-house surveillance, which would of course diminish in proportion as the temptation to smuggling would become less.
But it is answered, the duty is necessary to protect Parisian industry.
So be it; but do not then destroy the effect of it by your railroad.
For if you persist in your determination to keep the Belgian article on a par with the Parisian at forty francs, you must raise the duty to fifteen francs, in order to have:-- 20 francs--price at Brussels.
15 " protective duty.
5 " transportation by railroad.
-- 40 francs--total, at equalized prices.
And I now ask, of what benefit, under these circumstances, is the railroad?
Frankly, is it not humiliating to the nineteenth century, that it should be destined to transmit to future ages the example of such puerilities seriously and gravely practiced?
To be the dupe of another, is bad enough; but to employ all the forms and ceremonies of legislation in order to cheat one's self,--to doubly cheat one's self, and that too in a mere mathematical account,--truly this is calculated to lower a little the pride of this _enlightened age_.
X.
RECIPROCITY.
We have just seen that all which renders transportation difficult, acts in the same manner as protection; or, if the expression be preferred, that protection tends towards the same result as obstacles to transportation.
A tariff may then be truly spoken of, as a swamp, a rut, a steep hill; in a word, an _obstacle_, whose effect is to augment the difference between the price of consumption and that of production.

It is equally incontestable that a swamp, a bog, etc., are veritable protective tariffs.
There are people (few in number, it is true, but such there are) who begin to understand that obstacles are not the less obstacles, because they are artificially created, and that our well-being is more advanced by freedom of trade than by protection; precisely as a canal is more desirable than a sandy, hilly, and difficult road.
But they still say, this liberty ought to be reciprocal.

If we take off our taxes in favor of Spain, while Spain does not do the same towards us, it is evident that we are duped.

Let us then make _treaties of commerce_ upon the basis of a just reciprocity; let us yield where we are yielded to; let us make the _sacrifice_ of buying that we may obtain the advantage of selling.
Persons who reason thus, are (I am sorry to say), whether they know it or not, governed by the protectionist principle.