Is it not then a singular argument to say to him, "Because the taxes are heavy, we will raise prices higher for you; and because the State takes a part of your revenue, we will give another portion of it to benefit a monopoly ?" But let us examine more closely this Sophism so accredited among our legislators; although, strange to say, it is precisely those who keep up the unproductive imposts (according to our present hypothesis) who attribute to them afterwards our supposed inferiority, and seek to re-establish the equilibrium by further imposts and new clogs.
It appears to me to be evident that protection, without any change in its nature and effects, might have taken the form of a direct tax, raised by the State, and distributed as a premium to privileged industry.
Let us admit that foreign iron could be sold in our market at eight francs, but not lower; and French iron at not lower than twelve francs.
In this hypothesis there are two ways in which the State can secure the national market to the home producer.
The first, is to put upon foreign iron a duty of five francs.

This, it is evident, would exclude it, because it could no longer be sold at less than thirteen francs; eight francs for the cost price, five for the tax; and at this price it must be driven from the market by French iron, which we have supposed to cost twelve francs.

In this case the buyer, the consumer, will have paid all the expenses of the protection given.
The second means would be to lay upon the public a tax of five francs, and to give it as a premium to the iron manufacturer.

The effect would in either case be equally a protective measure.

Foreign iron would, according to both systems, be alike excluded; for our iron manufacturer could sell at seven francs, what, with the five francs premium, would thus bring him in twelve.