CAMBRAI 1917 The general situation on the British Western Front in November 1917, though fairly universally known to-day, may now be outlined, and the hopes and aims which led to the Cambrai offensive be touched on shortly.

The prolonged and hard-fought attacks in Flanders by the British, and in other portions of the front by the French, had caused the enemy to concentrate his forces in the threatened sectors, denuding those portions of the line which appeared reasonably safe and quiet.

The Cambrai sector was included among the latter, for not only was the ground very open, forbidding to us the unseen concentration of the large forces and masses of heavy artillery which at that period were deemed essential, but also the Hindenburg Line was immensely strong and the trenches so wide that the tanks in use by us could not cross them.
This enemy sector was, therefore, particularly suitable for surprise by us, as it was deemed by the enemy to be unassailable.
The Hindenburg Line ran north-west for six miles from the St.Quentin Canal at Banteux to Havrincourt on the Canal du Nord, where it bent sharply north for four miles to Moeuvres, thus making a pronounced salient.

The Commander-in-Chief's plan was to smash the salient, to occupy the high ground overlooking Cambrai--notably the Bourlon Wood Ridge--push cavalry through the gap in order to disorganise communications and the arrival of reinforcements, and to roll up the enemy's defences to the north-west.
The French held considerable forces in the immediate vicinity to exploit successes.

It was reckoned that the enemy could not reinforce his front under forty-eight hours.