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I must ask your attention therefore to the construction and application of the first section of that Act, as follows: 'that every person holding an official position to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein _otherwise provided_.' Then comes what is 'otherwise provided.' '_Provided_ however that the Secretaries of the State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Interior Departments, the Postmaster-General and Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively _for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate_.' "The first inquiry which arises on this language," said Judge Curtis, "is to the meaning of the words 'for and during the term of the President.' Mr.Stanton, as appears by the commission which has been put into the case by the honorable Managers, was appointed in January, 1862, during the first term of President Lincoln.

Are these words, 'during the term of the President,' applicable to Mr.Stanton's case?
That depends upon whether an expounder of this law judicially, who finds set down in it as a part of the descriptive words, '_during the term of the President_,' has any right to add '_and during any other term for which he may be afterwards elected_.' I respectfully submit no such judicial interpretation can be put on the words.

Then if you please, take the next step.