In view of the magnitude of the sum involved this was a new undertaking in the administration of Government finances.
The difficulties of the situation were undoubtedly aggravated and complicated by the questions which arose from the condition of the Southern States.

Could Congress expect at once that the populations in those States would begin to contribute to the revenue, would cease to require large expenditures for the maintenance of the National authority, would again add to the volume of our exports, to our commerce, and our general prosperity?
Serious re-action had in other lands followed the financial expansion created by great wars, even without complications similar to those which the disturbed condition of the South seemed to render unavoidable.

Ought Congress to accept such a re-action as the necessary condition of the restoration of our currency, of return to a normal situation, of adjustment of expenditure to revenue on a peace footing?
Could the possibility be entertained of such a return and such an adjustment, without panic, without paralysis of industry, without temporary interruption and prostration of commerce?
Grave apprehensions were felt as to the possible effect upon production and trade of the legislation required to maintain the National credit.

These apprehensions derived force and peculiar seriousness from the growing conflict between President Johnson and Congress upon measures of Reconstruction and upon removals from office.
In spite however of all suggested fears and doubts, a feeling of confidence pervaded the country, and was fully shared by Congress, that the power which had saved the Union could re-establish its credit without panic and without dangerous and prolonged depression.

Faith in the resources which had equipped and supported the National armies, now embraced the plainer and less exciting duties of funding and paying the debt and of protecting the notes of the United States.