This will be the case, not only as regards extent, but also as regards duration.
As soon, therefore, as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up, and peace will be the result.
We see, therefore, that in Wars where one side cannot completely disarm the other, the motives to peace on both sides will rise or fall on each side according to the probability of future success and the required outlay.

If these motives were equally strong on both sides, they would meet in the centre of their political difference.

Where they are strong on one side, they might be weak on the other.

If their amount is only sufficient, peace will follow, but naturally to the advantage of that side which has the weakest motive for its conclusion.

We purposely pass over here the difference which the POSITIVE and NEGATIVE character of the political end must necessarily produce practically; for although that is, as we shall hereafter show, of the highest importance, still we are obliged to keep here to a more general point of view, because the original political views in the course of the War change very much, and at last may become totally different, JUST BECAUSE THEY ARE DETERMINED BY RESULTS AND PROBABLE EVENTS.
Now comes the question how to influence the probability of success.
In the first place, naturally by the same means which we use when the object is the subjugation of the enemy, by the destruction of his military force and the conquest of his provinces; but these two means are not exactly of the same import here as they would be in reference to that object.