[On War by Carl von Clausewitz]@TWC D-Link bookOn War BOOK III 4/10
In Strategy, where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more room allowed for our own apprehensions and those of others, for objections and remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable regrets; and as we do not see things in Strategy as we do at least half of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions produced are less powerful.
The consequence is that most Generals, when they should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts. Now let us cast a glance at history--upon Frederick the Great's campaign of 1760, celebrated for its fine marches and manoeuvres: a perfect masterpiece of Strategic skill as critics tell us.
Is there really anything to drive us out of our wits with admiration in the King's first trying to turn Daun's right flank, then his left, then again his right, &c.? Are we to see profound wisdom in this? No, that we cannot, if we are to decide naturally and without affectation.
What we rather admire above all is the sagacity of the King in this respect, that while pursuing a great object with very limited means, he undertook nothing beyond his powers, and JUST ENOUGH to gain his object.
This sagacity of the General is visible not only in this campaign, but throughout all the three Wars of the Great King! To bring Silesia into the safe harbour of a well-guaranteed peace was his object. At the head of a small State, which was like other States in most things, and only ahead of them in some branches of administration; he could not be an Alexander, and, as Charles XII, he would only, like him, have broken his head.
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