The merit of resuscitating the idea of this means is not great, for it suggests itself at once to any one who breaks loose from the trammels of fashion.

Still it is necessary that it should suggest itself for us to bring it into consideration and compare it with the means which Buonaparte employed.

Whatever may be the result of the comparison, it is one which should not be omitted by criticism.
When Buonaparte, in February, 1814,( *) after gaining the battles at Etoges, Champ-Aubert, and Montmirail, left Bluecher's Army, and turning upon Schwartzenberg, beat his troops at Montereau and Mormant, every one was filled with admiration, because Buonaparte, by thus throwing his concentrated force first upon one opponent, then upon another, made a brilliant use of the mistakes which his adversaries had committed in dividing their forces.

If these brilliant strokes in different directions failed to save him, it was generally considered to be no fault of his, at least.

No one has yet asked the question, What would have been the result if, instead of turning from Bluecher upon Schwartzenberg, he had tried another blow at Bluecher, and pursued him to the Rhine?
We are convinced that it would have completely changed the course of the campaign, and that the Army of the Allies, instead of marching to Paris, would have retired behind the Rhine.