The statute to which I have just referred was intended to cure both these difficulties; first, by making persons liable to punishment who fraudulently appropriated the property of others, notwithstanding they had come rightfully into possession; and next, the necessity of setting forth the particular transaction was obviated by an enactment that it should be enough to prove the embezzlement of any sum of money within six months of the time specified in the indictment.
After the conviction of Wyman, the case was carried to the Supreme Court, which held that the statute making bank officers liable included bank presidents.

But the court held that the other part of the statute, providing for the mode of setting forth the offence in the indictment, did not apply to bank officers; and that they could only be held on an indictment which described the particular transaction, with time and place.

So the verdict of guilty against Wyman was set aside, and a new trial ordered.
Before the new trial came on at Concord, a statute was passed by the Legislature for the purpose of meeting this very case, extending the provisions of the Revised Statutes as to the mode of pleading in such cases to officers of banks.

It was claimed and argued by Mr.Choate, with great zeal, eloquence, and learning, that this was an _ex post facto_ law, which could not, under the Constitution, be made applicable to transactions which happened before its passage.

Mr.Choate argued this question for several hours.