In the meantime the king of France seemed to act heartily as a principal in the treaty of partition.

His ministers at foreign courts co-operated with those of the maritime powers in soliciting the accession of the different potentates in Europe.
When count Zinzendorf, the imperial ambassador at Paris, presented a memorial, desiring to know what part France would act should the king of Spain voluntarily place a grandson of Louis upon the throne, the marquis de Torcy answered in writing, that his most christian majesty would by no means listen to such a proposal; nay, when the emperor's minister gave them to understand that his master was ready to begin a separate negotiation with the court of Versailles, touching the Spanish succession, Louis declared he could not treat on that subject without the concurrence of his allies.
The nature of the partition-treaty was no sooner known in England, than condemned by the most intelligent part of the nation.

They first of all complained, that such an important affair should be concluded without the advice of parliament.

They observed that the scheme was unjust, and the execution of it hazardous; that in concerting the terms, the maritime powers seemed to have acted as partizans of France; for the possession of Naples and the Tuscan ports would subject Italy to her dominion, and interfere with the English trade to the Levant and Mediterranean; while Guipuscoa, on any future rupture, would afford another inlet into the heart of the Spanish dominions; they, for these reasons, pronounced the treaty destructive of the balance of power, and prejudicial to the interest of England.

All these arguments were trumpeted by the malcontents, so that the whole kingdom echoed with the clamour of disaffection.