No maxim of law, it was said, is more established, or more universally allowed, than that privilege of parliament extends not to treason, felony, or breach of peace; nor has either house, during former ages, ever pretended, in any of those cases, to interpose in behalf of its members.

Though some inconveniencies should result from the observance of this maxim, that would not be sufficient, without other authority, to abolish a principle established by uninterrupted precedent, and founded on the tacit consent of the whole legislature.

But what are the inconveniencies so much dreaded?
The king, on pretence of treason, may seize any members of the opposite faction, and for a time gain to his partisans the majority of voices.

But if he seize only a few, will he not lose more friends by such a gross artifice than he confines enemies?
If he seize a great number, is not this expedient force, open and barefaced?
And what remedy at all times against such force, but to oppose to it a force which is superior?
Even allowing that the king intended to employ violence, not authority, for seizing the members; though at that time, and ever afterwards, he positively asserted the contrary; yet will his conduct admit of excuse.

That the hall where the parliament assembles is an inviolable sanctuary, was never yet pretended.