An entity merely known as spatially related to some discerned entity is what we mean by the bare idea of 'place.' The concept of place marks the disclosure in sense-awareness of entities in nature known merely by their spatial relations to discerned entities.

It is the disclosure of the discernible by means of its relations to the discerned.
This disclosure of an entity as a relatum without further specific discrimination of quality is the basis of our concept of significance.
In the above example the thing seen was significant, in that it disclosed its spatial relations to other entities not necessarily otherwise entering into consciousness.

Thus significance is relatedness, but it is relatedness with the emphasis on one end only of the relation.
For the sake of simplicity I have confined the argument to spatial relations; but the same considerations apply to temporal relations.

The concept of 'period of time' marks the disclosure in sense-awareness of entities in nature known merely by their temporal relations to discerned entities.

Still further, this separation of the ideas of space and time has merely been adopted for the sake of gaining simplicity of exposition by conformity to current language.