This really raises the fundamental question as to what characteristics causal nature should have in common with apparent nature.

Why--on this theory--should the cause which influences the mind to perception have any characteristics in common with the effluent apparent nature?
In particular, why should it be in space?
Why should it be in time?
And more generally, What do we know about mind which would allow us to infer any particular characteristics of a cause which should influence mind to particular effects?
The transcendence of time beyond nature gives some slight reason for presuming that causal nature should occupy time.

For if the mind occupies periods of time, there would seem to be some vague reason for assuming that influencing causes occupy the same periods of time, or at least, occupy periods which are strictly related to the mental periods.
But if the mind does not occupy volumes of space, there seems to be no reason why causal nature should occupy any volumes of space.

Thus space would seem to be merely apparent in the same sense as apparent nature is merely apparent.

Accordingly if science is really investigating causes which operate on the mind, it would seem to be entirely on the wrong tack in presuming that the causes which it is seeking for have spatial relations.