In the first place there is the idea of an object; and secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that object and some present objects.
To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and the same mental fact.

But the former mode of stating the fact of memory is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be said that the latter does.

It is perfectly possible to have the idea of an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the present state E, as mere mental pictures.

It is hardly to be doubted that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak; and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their memories.

But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and purposes believe their memories.