The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing.

Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and dependent beings.
"Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from the mere perception.

So strong is the prejudice for the distinct continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their very senses contradict this philosophy.

'Tis also evident that colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on perception nor reason, but on the imagination.

For as they are confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, wherein possibly can their difference consist?
Upon the whole, then, we may conclude that, as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."-- (I.p.
250, 251.) The last words of this passage are as much Berkeley's as Hume's.