The revolution in France, they conceived, had produced no change in the relations between the two nations; nor was there any thing in the alteration of government, or in the character of the war, which would impair the right of France to demand, or weaken the duty of the United States faithfully to comply with the engagements which had been solemnly formed.
The secretaries of the treasury, and of war, held a different opinion.
Admitting in its fullest latitude the right of a nation to change its political institutions according to its own will, they denied its right to involve other nations, _absolutely and unconditionally_, in the consequences of the changes which it may think proper to make.
They maintained the right of a nation to absolve itself from the obligations even of real treaties, when such a change of circumstances takes place in the internal situation of the other contracting party, as so essentially to alter the existing state of things, that it may with good faith be pronounced to render a continuance of the connexion which results from them, disadvantageous or dangerous.
They reviewed the most prominent of those transactions which had recently taken place in France, and noticed the turbulence, the fury, and the injustice with which they were marked.

The Jacobin club at Paris, whose influence was well understood, had even gone so far, previous to the meeting of the convention, as to enter into measures with the avowed object of purging that body of those persons, favourers of royalty, who might have escaped the attention of the primary assemblies.

This review was taken, to show that the course of the revolution had been attended with circumstances which militate against a full conviction of its having been brought to its present stage, by such a free, regular, and deliberate act of the nation, as ought to silence all scruples about the validity of what had been done.

They appeared to doubt whether the present possessors of power ought to be considered as having acquired it with the real consent of France, or as having seized it by violence;--whether the existing system could be considered as permanent, or merely temporary.
They were therefore of opinion, not that the treaties should be annulled or absolutely suspended, but that the United States should reserve, for future consideration and discussion, the question whether the operation of those treaties ought not to be deemed temporarily and provisionally suspended.

Should this be the decision of the government, they thought it due to a spirit of friendly and candid procedure, in the most conciliating terms, to apprize the expected minister of this determination.
On the questions relative to the application of the clause of guarantee to the existing war, some diversity of sentiment also prevailed.