Perhaps indeed bank bills would be a more convenient vehicle than treasury orders; but a little difference in the degree of convenience can not constitute the _necessity_ which the constitution makes the ground for assuming any non-enumerated power.
Besides, the existing state banks would, without doubt, enter into arrangements for lending their agency.

This expedient alone suffices to prevent the existence of that _necessity_ which may justify the assumption of a non-enumerated power as a means for carrying into effect an enumerated one.
It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the states, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a single state.

So it would be still more convenient that there should be a bank whose bills should have a currency all over the world; but it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that there exists any where a power to establish such a bank, or that the world may not go on very well without it.
For a shade or two of convenience, more or less, it can not be imagined that the constitution intended to invest congress with a power so important as that of erecting a corporation.
In supporting the constitutionality of the act, it was laid down as a general proposition, "that every power vested in a government is in its nature _sovereign_," and includes by _force_ of the _term_, a right to employ all the _means_ requisite and _fairly applicable to_ the attainment of the _ends_ of such power; and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the constitution, are not immoral, are not contrary to the essential ends of political society.
This principle, in its application to government in general, would be admitted as an axiom; and it would be incumbent on those who might refuse to acknowledge its influence in American affairs to _prove_ a distinction; and to show that a rule which, in the general system of things, is essential to the preservation of the social order, is inapplicable to the United States.
The circumstance that the powers of sovereignty are divided between the national and state governments, does not afford the distinction required.

It does not follow from this, that each of the portions of power delegated to the one or to the other, is not sovereign with regard to its _proper objects_.

It will only follow from it, that each has sovereign power as to certain things, and not as to other things.
If the government of the United States does not possess sovereign power as to its declared purposes and trusts, because its power does not extend to all cases, neither would the several states possess sovereign power in any case; for their powers do not extend to every case.