Still greater mischief was to be apprehended.

A great part of this additional debt would go into the hands of foreigners; and the United States would be heavily burdened to pay an interest which could not be expected to remain in the country.
The measure was unjust, because it was burdening those states which had taxed themselves highly to discharge the claims of their creditors, with the debts of those which had not made the same exertions.

It would delay the settlement of accounts between the individual states and the United States; and the supporters of the measure were openly charged with intending to defeat that settlement.
It was also said that, in its execution, the scheme would be found extremely embarrassing, perhaps impracticable.

The case of a partial accession to the measure by the creditors, a case which would probably occur, presented a difficulty for which no provision was made, and of which no solution had been given.

Should the creditors in some states come into the system, and those in others refuse to change their security, the government would be involved in perplexities from which no means of extricating itself had been shown.