But Morgan had great and just confidence in himself and in his troops; he was unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedly his superior as to render it madness to fight him; and he also thought that, if he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued and retreating, the probability of success would be much less than if he should exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice.
These considerations determined him to halt earlier than was absolutely necessary.[56] [Footnote 56: These reasons for his conduct were given to the author by General Morgan soon after his return from the southern campaign.] [Sidenote: Battle of the Cowpens.] Tarlton, having left his baggage under a strong guard, with orders not to move until break of day, recommenced the pursuit at three in the morning.
Before day, Morgan was informed of his approach, and prepared to receive him.
Although censured by many for having determined to fight, and by some for the ground he chose, all admit the judgment with which his disposition was made.
On an eminence, in an open wood, he drew up his continental troops, and Triplet's corps, deemed equal to continentals, amounting to between four and five hundred men, who were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard.

In their rear, on the descent of the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Washington was posted with his cavalry, and a small body of mounted Georgia militia commanded by Major M'Call, as a corps de reserve.

On these two corps rested his hopes of victory, and with them he remained in person.

The front line was composed entirely of militia, under the command of Colonel Pickens.

Major M'Dowell, with a battalion of North Carolina volunteers, and Major Cunningham, with a battalion of Georgia volunteers, were advanced about one hundred and fifty yards in front of this line, with orders to give a single fire as the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals, which were left for them in the centre of the first line.