His numbers were exaggerated, and his means of carrying on offensive operations were magnified.

The expulsion of the British army from Boston had been long since anticipated by many; and those were not wanting, who endeavoured to spread discontent by insinuating that the Commander-in-chief was desirous of prolonging the war, in order to continue his own importance.

To these symptoms of impatience, and to the consequences they might produce, he could not be insensible; but it was not in his power to silence such complaints, by disclosing to the world his real situation.

His views still continued to be directed towards Boston; and, congress having manifested a disposition favourable to an attack on that place, the general officers had been again assembled, and had again advised unanimously against the measure.

Supposing that fears for the safety of the town might embarrass the proceedings of the army, congress resolved, "that if General Washington and his council of war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think expedient, notwithstanding the town and property in it might be thereby destroyed." [Sidenote: Plans for attacking Boston.] Whilst waiting for a favourable opportunity to execute this bold plan, the American general availed himself of the occasional aids received from the militia, to make advances on the besieged, and to seize positions which would favour ulterior operations.