For although he was a great admirer of Aristotle's work, he became convinced that his methods of approaching study were entirely wrong.
"The opinion of Aristotle," he says, in his De Argumentum Scientiarum, "seemeth to me a negligent opinion, that of those things which exist by nature nothing can be changed by custom; using for example, that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear better.
For though this principle be true in things wherein nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a latitude.

For he might see that a straight glove will come more easily on with use; and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger; and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like; which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth than those instances which he allegeth."(1) These were his opinions, formed while a young man in college, repeated at intervals through his maturer years, and reiterated and emphasized in his old age.

Masses of facts were to be obtained by observing nature at first hand, and from such accumulations of facts deductions were to be made.

In short, reasoning was to be from the specific to the general, and not vice versa.
It was by his teachings alone that Bacon thus contributed to the foundation of modern science; and, while he was constantly thinking and writing on scientific subjects, he contributed little in the way of actual discoveries.

"I only sound the clarion," he said, "but I enter not the battle." The case of Descartes, however, is different.