As long as fighting proceeded Wilson was master of the world.

He had only to call back his troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be placed in a most difficult position.

It has always been incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to preserve his own war aims.
The secret information that I received soon after the publication of the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated France's, and particularly Italy's, opposition.

The logical and practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace negotiations.

Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between Wilson's and Orlando's ideas of peace remained open.
On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them to be--in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies--a suitable basis for negotiations.