When Clemenceau came into office the definite destruction of Germany was the dominant war aim.
To those who neither see nor hear the secret information which a Foreign Minister naturally has at his disposal, it may appear as though the Entente, in the question of crushing Germany's military strength, had sometimes been ready to make concessions.

I think that this may have been the case in the spring of 1917, but not later, when any such hope was deceptive.

Lansdowne in particular spoke and wrote in a somewhat friendly tone, but Lloyd George was the determining influence in England.
When sounding England on different occasions, I endeavoured to discover by what means the dissolution of the military power in Germany was to be or could be guaranteed--and I invariably came to an _impasse_.

It was never explained how England intended to carry out the proposal.
The truth is that there is no way of disarming a strong and determined people except by defeating them, but such an aim was not to be openly admitted to us in the preliminary dealings.

The delegates could not suggest any suitable mode of discussion, and no other proposals could lead to a decision.
Lansdowne, and perhaps Asquith as well, would have been content with a parliamentary regime which would have deprived the Emperor of power and given it to the Reichstag.