I was full of confidence in the future, and even if that were not the case I could not conclude a peace in the present situation which the Entente could not dictate in other terms, even if we were beaten.

To lose Trieste and access to the Adriatic was a totally unacceptable condition, just as much as the unconditional surrender of Alsace-Lorraine.
Neutral statesmen agreed with my views that the Entente demands were not couched in the terms of a peace of understanding, but of victory.
Opinion in neutral countries was quite clear on the subject.

But in England especially there were various currents of thought; not everyone shared Lloyd George's views.

The main point was, however, to lead up to a debate which would tend to clear up many matters, and I seized the idea eagerly.

The greatest difficulty, I was assured by some, lay in the Entente's assertion that Germany had shown remarkable military strength, but yet had not been adequately prepared for war; she had not had sufficient stores either of raw materials or provisions, and had not built sufficient U-boats.